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abstract The impact and relevance of economic theory to the development of “A Theory of 
Justice” are often left aside in the immense literature regarding the works of John Rawls. 
And yet, understanding the elements of political economy in Rawls’ work is fundamental 
for the comprehension of why Rawls’ will abandons a utilitarian approach to political 
philosophy and, consequentially, for our understanding of the main issues that motivate 
the notion of Justice as Fairness. This article has two mains goals: First, to describe the 
influence of John Stuart Mill, Kenneth Arrow and Vilfredo Pareto in the methodological turn 
found in the idea of the Original Position; and second, to describe the historical elements 
that are presupposed for the conceivability of Rawls’ ideals. I conclude the present paper 
with some remarks suggesting a historicist and phenomenological complement to the ideal 
descriptions found in political liberalism as understood by Rawls.
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In 1929 Wittgenstein presented, in Cambridge, a lecture on ethics. This 
would be the only time the author would dedicate his focus to the topic. 
The article indicates the immense difficulty in establishing a language 
in which one can deal with ethics and value constitution. The “running 
against the boundaries of our cage”2 described by Wittgenstein hides a 
peculiar concern: could statements about ethics ever be the case? That 
is, could they ever be considered true or false? This takes us back to the 
question of what allows us to say that an object “q” has properties “z,” 
“y” or “a” that permits us to speak of that object as “q,” and should those 
properties cease to be the case for “q”, then “q” will no longer be the case 
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at all. Very well, when dealing with physical objects or with facts of nature, 
such statements of “case” might be, at least prima facie, easier to denote. It 
is true that Force equals Mass times Acceleration, it is true that a body in 
rest will remain at rest until something disturbs its condition, and it is true 
that the blackness of the keyboard in which I type this text is the result 
of an interaction of light waves that travel at an approximate velocity of 
3.0×108 m/s. But these statements are reproducing laws of physics, and 
we have a particular language in which to deal with these laws – granted, 
this is also an imperfect language, but even with this proviso in mind, one 
is hard pressed to find a hypothesis in which we will note that the inertia 
is not the case. Now, what can we say regarding value-like judgments?
If the German and French tradition focused on speculative conditions 
for moral theory and the connection between the moral and the legal, 
English and American modernism is marked by a sharp focus on economics. 
Perhaps this is an acknowledgment of the limits of moral theory: since 
we cannot quite grasp the processes of value constitution and identity, we 
could focus on how we establish preferences and how these preferences 
result in dynamics of exchange of value. It also recognizes that the 
constitutional organization of societal dissent becomes an irresistible trend 
in European politics after the Westphalia Peace – and such constitutional 
organization brings with it the bureaucratic organization of Capitalism. 
In that sense, Rawls is right, in 19743, when he decides to focus on 
the elements of Political Economy in Utilitarianism in order to build his 
critique of comparative-advantage models of political philosophy. The 
motivation for this focus is twofold: first, the acknowledgement that after 
the recognition of the prevalence of Rights, the debate on which values 
should be considered universal is no longer controversial4; second, after the 
emergence of the liberal doctrine of rights, economic theory is the only 
sort of comprehensive doctrine that needs to be argued in political terms: 
again, the focus is on how Rights should be implemented and not why5. 
It is no coincidence that Rawls builds much of his reflections on the 
presuppositions built by Pareto and later by Arrow6. It was Arrow that was 
able to proof that Pareto’s complex system for a social equilibrium was 
possible, at least mathematically, in a plane. But he was also able to point 
at mathematical discrepancies in the general development of a democratic 
system. That is, even in very minimal conditions, it was nearly impossible, 
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from the standpoint of political economy, to assert a mathematically sound 
form for a democratic system.
Now I want to develop the conditions, from the standpoint of political 
economy, which will allow Rawls to develop a methodological core for 
his defense of liberal politics. Rawls describes the processes of social 
choice and preferences leading to the development of liberal societies. 
Such description is operative on the basis of rational choice theory and 
utilitarian theory, which Rawls attempts to overcome in his account of 
a Universalist, principle-based, description of the prevalence of Rights. 
In this sense, we must understand which elements of Economic Theory 
are fundamental for the development of Rawls’ magnus opus. Tackling 
such elements will allow us to identify the main issues found by Rawls 
on utilitarian theory. Such issues, it seems to me, are not of philosophical, 
but rather economical origin.
As far as Political Economy is concerned, the entire debate on 
preferences circles around a single idea developed by Stuart Mill: the notion 
of “The Decided Preference Criterion”. On the fourth chapter of his 
masterpiece Utilitarianism, Mill anticipates the further two hundred years 
of debate on Rational Choice in a simple succession of statements about 
preferences. First, Mill suggests that it is possible to prefer one pleasure 
over another. Then, that if one pleasure is perceived as in higher order than 
another, it is reasonable to assume that individuals that experience these 
pleasures of a higher order will seek activities and experiences that lead 
to this pleasure. And will, of course, avoid activities and experiences that 
will cause the desired pleasure to stop, or that will cause it to disappear. 
Also, it is possible to prefer to avoid means to a certain pleasure (even 
of a higher order) if circumstances would cause such discomfort that 
the obtained pleasure would be, in context, meaningless. In that sense, 
if I really enjoy lemon ice cream, I will seek experiences that lead me 
to lemon ice cream – rather than chocolate ice cream, which I loathe. 
However, if circumstances would have me tortured, or have me killing 
babies by throwing them against a wall, or have me eating chocolate ice 
cream so I could have lemon ice cream, then it is perfectly reasonable to 
prefer not to have lemon ice cream.
Now, the key point for the possibility of even conceiving of such pleasures 
is that individuals are able to develop “habits of self-consciousness and 
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self-observation”7. This means that a decision on preferences, particularly 
on higher-order preferences, must be a somewhat informed decision, that 
is, individuals that decide on preferences are making decisions with some 
degree of consciousness on the causal chain that lead from an experience 
onto a pleasure, and that they are able to understand at least some of the 
more intricate subtleties of such causal chain. Furthermore, Mill trusts 
that people have preferences because they have preferences. That is, they are 
only marginally affected by external factors and circumstantial advantages 
(though, as I have mentioned, there is a proviso for certain means for an 
end that could imply suffering or discomfort of a higher order than the 
order of the preference in view).
a) Some examples of Pareto Efficiency in choice
Before moving further, I want to clarify some aspects of Pareto Efficiency. First 
of all, we must understand that Pareto Efficiency has two possible scenarios to 
deal with; on the one hand we have a scenario where a dominant strategy is 
given such as actors that choose can have their best desired choices given to 
them (or at least conceive of these possibilities in a plane). On the other hand, 
we have scenarios where a dominant strategy is not given in such a way, as the 
best desired choices are not conceivably available for actors.
So, let there be two actors choosing fruits, where 100 is favorite, 50 is 
acceptable and 0 is unacceptable
Actor one values
a) Grapes – 100
b) Grapefruit – 51
c) Lemmon – 1
Actor two values 
a) Lemmon – 100
b) Grapefruit – 51
c) Grapes – 1
Now, evidently in all cases where one and two are choosing 
independently of each other and have all three possibilities given to them 
without any sort of interference, they will independently choose (a) and 
grant their highest pleasure. This is a max-max scenario.
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However, given a plane where individuals are choosing scarce goods 
such scenarios is a bit different.
Let there be a scenario where different possible choices are given to 
actors A(x) and B(y)
             B
         1     2
A  1        100, 1    50, 50
  2        50, 1    1, 100
In that case, it is feasible that individuals will opt out of their most 
preferred choice (100) so that they won’t hurt the available choices for 
(B). This is a Weak Pareto Efficiency. That is, individuals in a plane can 
choose feasible states. 
This presupposes that individuals will not act in an egotistical way to 
grant his own best pleasure disregarding putting others in a worst-off 
situation. For Pareto the management of resources becomes a key factor here 
to avoid civil unrest (but this is a different discussion altogether). 
Hence, for all sets of possibilities where {a, b, c} are given for actors as 
possible choices, a Pareto efficiency will tell us that the reasonable choice 
(for 1 and 2) is preferring (b), as moderate choices are more likely to lead 
to efficient outcomes as:
a-b < b – c
-2b < -a-c
b<a/2+c/2
Now, as we increase the number of social states and social choices, the 
board here will get more and more complex. Also, this situation supposes 
a scenario of unforced equilibrium (that is, both parts can get a feasible 
social state). This is what we call a max-mini scenario. An interesting feature 
of this scenario is that in terms of social choice it implies that actors can 
have better outcomes (in the long run) by choosing preferences that are 
less desirable in their own ranks (that is, acting in a selfish manner can be 
a trait of economical irrationality).
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The graph above offers an example of such a scenario. Given that 
the blocks are possible choices, most of the equilibrium points between 
(f1) and (f2) will be in the lower end of the spectrum. Now, observe 
that two of these available states are desirable for both (f1) and (f2) and 
are hence “optimum” in max-mini terms. Other points can be a point 
of equilibrium, in economic terms (that is, there is enough of these 
goods for both actors), but the choice of these goods would imply 
one of the actors to be “worse off ” than the other one in the end of 
the process of choice. This point of equilibrium is the core of Rawls’ 
difference principle8.
Pareto also conceives of similar scenarios where such distribution of 
commodities is not feasible. In that case, the efficient point is the point 
where the least bad favorable set of choices is made available for the biggest 
number of actors in the choice plane. This is dubbed, in economics, a bliss 
point, also, a mini-max scenario.
Finally, a last scenario is given in the plane where all the available 
goods are terrible or goods are unavailable (think of post-war Germany, 
Japan, and Vietnam). This would be a mini-mini scenario.
In a mini-max and in a mini-mini scenario a Pareto Efficiency 
is impossible. Given that a Pareto Efficiency is dubbed a principle of 
economical rationality in most of post-war literature, any scenario as such 
them becomes an undesirable point, or, if you prefer, an irrational system 
of distribution.
b) An economic theory of democracy
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Arrow, under heavy influence of Pareto, will attempt to further control 
the elements in Mill’s criterion for choice. First of all, he will hold that 
having a preference only means that one is able to express a hierarchy 
of values or of choices in accordance to two general principles of 
connectivity and transitivity9. Having a preference, then, means to be able 
to (A1) express a hierarchy and (A2) hold the internal coherency of the 
hierarchy of values10. It is very important to note that Arrow does not care 
for the motivations behind the process of achieving a preference. What 
matters here is that an individual can and will express a consistent set of 
preferences. This is true to the way in which we decide on our favorite 
flavors for ice cream, or on our favorite candidates in an election. Any 
rational actor, for Arrow, will remain consistent in her options. Take, for 
example, when one says that one prefers Lemon to Orange and Orange 
to Mellon, it will necessarily follow that one will prefer Lemon to Mellon 
(by A2). This is, of course, a very weak notion of rationality11 insofar 
it only asks of an actor to maintain a minimal consistency in her own 
expression of preferences.
But how do we move from individual ranking of preferences onto a 
social ranking of preferences? 
Arrow will name “the social welfare function”12 the process by 
which individual preferences are represented in an election. Voters will 
be able to decide on a number of commodities (objects of choice) that 
will constitute a social state (a conceivable set of commodities) which 
represents individual orderings of preferences. The social welfare function 
is such that the set of orderings (R) of different voters will be taken in 
consideration so that for any two social states x and y of a given social 
ordering R will be given13.
The social welfare function operates in this manner regardless of 
individual expressions of any sort of preferences. The rule overrides 
individual preferences in accordance to the general will. Now, I realize 
the dangers of suggesting that Arrow is following a classic conception of 
general will, but in fact, once we analyze the conditions in which the social 
welfare function operates, it will become more and more clear the extent 
to which Arrow is relying on a classical-liberal notion of democracy.
For Arrow, we must first ask what are the conditions that satisfy the 
form of a democratic system? If we could organize the criteria according 
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to which we think through democracy, what would be the general set of 
rules that would need to be followed in order for an election to be called 
democratic, or for the establishment of social welfare?
Arrow’s dissertation Social Choice and Individual Values14, holds that a 
(and perhaps any) plausible definition of Democracy is incomplete. This 
means, in the terms first developed by Godel, that the set of requirements 
established in order to reach a conclusion that “p is the case” end up 
causing that “~p is the case.” The act of voting is important here because 
it is the moment in which individuals choose for a certain set of social 
preferences that are represented in a candidate or in a policy. If there is 
something fundamentally paradoxical in the act of voting, then the entire 
idea of a democracy will fall to pieces, after all, even direct modes of 
representation still presuppose the existence of some sort of election. 
On the one hand, it is sufficient, for Arrow, that individuals are expressing 
their individual preferences in accordance to criteria of transitivity and 
connectivity. On the other hand, he super-imposes a number of conditions 
of reasonability for the achievement of an acceptable constitution (in 
this case, an acceptable election). So far, we know that the social welfare 
function will be as complex as the number of available social states, the 
multiplicity of chosen social states and the number of individuals. 
Furthermore, the conditions in which individuals vote must be so that 
a set of “control criteria” are met. 
(C1) Non-dictatorship (ND): The social welfare function should 
account for the wishes of multiple individuals. It cannot simply mimic 
the preferences of a single individual.
(C2) Universality (U): For any set of individual voter preferences, 
the social welfare function should yield a unique and complete ranking 
of societal choices. It must do so in a manner that results in a complete 
ranking of preferences for society (by A1) and it necessarily provides the 
same ranking each time voters’ preferences are presented the same way 
(by A2)
(C3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): Irrelevant alternatives 
cannot impact on relevant alternatives. That is, a change in the expression 
of an irrelevant subset cannot influence the ranking of the relevant subset – 
strategic movement of irrelevant values in order to affect relevant values is 
thus avoided as well as incompleteness in the relevant subset.
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(C4) Monotonicity (Mono): For all individual set of choices ‘r’ there 
will correspond a social ordering ‘R’. Any promotion in ‘r’ entails a 
promotion in ‘R’ or, in the worst case, the repetition of the status quo 
ante. A promotion in ‘r’ can never correspond to a decrease of the social 
ordering in ‘R’. An individual should not have to vote against the proposal 
that he wishes to pass in order to promote it (by C2 and A2). In other 
words, values present in r will supervene in R.
(C5) Non-imposition (NI): Individuals are free to decide their order 
of preference without external coercion. Any result is possible within 
the given set in the beginning of an election, and any given ranking is 
possible within the set. The social welfare function has an unrestricted 
space within the set of possible alternatives.
In theory, Pareto had indicated that any distribution of goods, in a 
plane, always means that the gain of an individual (or social group) causes 
another individual (or social group) to lose. In that sense, processes of 
exchange would never be a situation, where parties could benefit equally. 
Except given the conditions for a free and informed process of exchange, 
where parties could express and negotiate their preferences with minor 
interference, leading to a mark wherein the gain of an individual would 
not cause other individual to lose. Pareto expressed the plausibility of 
the notion of the “invisible hand” of the market which would be able to 
mitigate the processes of social loss and gain in a hypothetical equilibrium.
Arrow was able to demonstrate that such an ideal position, dubbed 
“the first principle of Welfare economics,” was mathematically possible 
in a plane, given that individuals were indeed in a situation of “perfect 
information”15 and that certain conditions for the ranking of preferences 
were present. Such criteria for choice are the same that I analyzed 
above, and the same that led, even given very narrow criteria for reason 
and rationality in choice, to paradoxical scenarios regarding the Social 
Welfare Function16. Note that Arrow’s conditions for choice are the same 
conditions that Pareto developed for his idea of efficiency, and are, for 
Arrow, equivalent to a Reasonability criteria17. 
In this sense, the social welfare reproduces individual preferences indirectly 
even though they are expressed directly, it also avoids that irrelevant issues 
become decisive in the definition of a Social Welfare Function. Arrow will 
not justify his principles of democratic order to a great extent. His main 
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contention is that they “seem to be sound” and that they fit the modern 
interpretation of what a democracy requires to be called a democracy. Note 
that neither of these conditions is sufficient alone for a democratic system. 
They are all together necessary for a sufficient conception of Democracy 
– and note that this sufficient conception of Democracy looks very much 
like a constitutional democracy such as the one we will find as the basic 
structure for institutional fairness later in Rawls. 
This is mostly because individuals will not act without aiming at 
individual benefit, even at the expense of others, without some sort 
of regulatory mark or safety net. In a system of unequal opportunities 
and unequal preferences, individuals will not choose in a well-ordered, 
previously expected, manner, just to submit to the elegance of Arrow’s 
mathematical notations18. Perhaps this is why Arrow himself focused on 
elements of value in the end of his dissertation, noting that some sort 
of ethical “guideline” is necessary for the “soundness” of the democratic 
proposition19.
c) Utility calculation and Justice as Fairness
It seems to me that it is at this point that Rawls sees the limits of 
utilitarian20 theory and decides to focus on a Kantian approach to 
political theory. Given only the elements of utility calculation we will not 
reach, in Rawls, the scenario in which we could build a reasonable Social 
Welfare Function. But it is clear that without Arrow, Rawls could not 
have developed his idea of original position, nor could have him noted 
the conditions for principles of justice.21 
But I think it is important to emphasize that the doctrine of liberalism 
is first and foremost understood by Rawls, at least in A Theory of Justice, 
as a method. This means that ideals like the original position, reflective 
equilibrium and considered moral judgments are, at first, not understood 
as a matter of fact, but rather nominal conditions for a particular doctrine 
of liberalism that Rawls wishes to advance.
The idea of the original position starts from a shared suspicion among 
modern philosophers against personal experience as a justification for the 
expression of political priorities. It seems that Rawls wants to take the 
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procedure of de-personalization, invented by Kant in the development of 
the Categorical Imperative, as a procedure for validity of conduct, even 
further. After all, the original position requires not only that parts go 
further than their sensible motivations for conduct would take them, it 
actually requires that parts act as if their sensible motivations for conduct, 
their personal history and so on, were actually never the case. 
This hypothetical exercise would then put individuals in a situation 
where former “prejudices” or “judgments” on conduct, former experiences 
are left at the door when individuals enter the procedure for a rational 
choice of values for a social welfare function. Why so? This has two main 
reasons; on the one hand, we have Rawls’ trust in the Kantian proviso that 
reason alone, that is, a speculative use of reason, could give a framework of 
which values matter. On the other hand, Rawls relies deeply on insights 
from economic theory.
The notion of an original position is then a requirement for the 
soundness of the reflective equilibrium in a social welfare function and the 
reflective equilibrium is a mirror image of the idea of the aforementioned 
Pareto’s equilibrium, that is, the point where in an exchange would not 
necessarily imply a situation where the benefit of an individual (or group) 
in a social welfare function will not cause other individual (or groups) in 
a social welfare function to be worst off22. 
Now, I want to ask how individuals in the original position look like. 
Granted that Rawls stresses the hypothetical character of the position, and 
that it belongs in the realm of ideal theory, I believe the question remains 
valid: what do the hypothetical individuals in the hypothetical original 
position look like?
Will individuals in the original position be aware of the potential 
consequences of their choices for values, and will they have knowledge 
about future conditions, for example, in order to know that not suffering 
from starvation is preferable to suffering from starvation, and hence 
policies and principles that will avoid starvation are preferable to policies 
and principles that will lead some people to starvation but might get 
other people rich beyond their wildest dreams?
In that case, is it really sound to say that individuals in the original 
position are dropping their considerations about current social reality 
when they reach the situation wherein they are making social choices? 
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I realize this is all somewhat counter-intuitive if we follow a canonic 
interpretation of what Rawls is proposing. In a purely charitable 
interpretation, it should suffice to conceive of a possible position where 
individuals will somewhat intuitively know that minimal conditions for 
social justice are preferable to conditions for social injustice.
It is that sense that I insist that, in heart, A Theory of Justice is dealing 
with a method for political theory in its first part, and this method 
deals with the conditions where in the ideal social welfare function of 
a liberal society is possible. Part of this core supposes that individuals 
will intuitively prefer not to feel pain, rather than to feel pain; that 
they will prefer values that will potentially grant more rather than less 
freedom. The other and perhaps less persuasive part of the method, deals 
with a sort of abandonment of the current social reality when one is 
conceiving of these preferences. For Rawls, this is a fundamental move 
in order to erase prejudices and potential advantages that individuals 
might have been “polluted” with when developing their current value 
judgments. Considered value judgments will then be justified when they 
are valid within the scope of the Original Position, and will potentially 
conduct society to a position of reflective equilibrium, that is, a position 
wherein the expression of individual preferences for one policy or one 
plan of life is not potentially harmful to the possible expression of other 
individual preferences.
The key adjective for Rawls, then, quickly becomes “reasonable,” and 
reasonable is synonymous with the intuitive considerations hypothetical 
individuals are able to justify from the standpoint of a hypothetical 
original position. Clearly, Rawls still believes in the powers of speculative 
reason and of the possibility of detaching value considerations from social 
contingencies when doing so. As far as ideal theory goes, this is pretty 
far in the Kantian spectrum of the board – but Rawls believes that the 
actuality of the Kantian thesis is supported by what political economy 
tells us about potential collaboration and competition among individuals 
in an exchange model.
However, the model proposed by Pareto and adopted by Rawls 
presupposes conditions for the processes of choice: it presupposes a 
number of ideal situations and ideal individuals that are necessary for 
the establishment of a certain position of ideal exchange of values. It also 
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presupposes that individuals are not under stress of previous experiences 
when they are making “reasonable” choices about their preferences. 
These are, of course, awfully heavy presuppositions.
Rawls knows this, and it is not a coincidence that the second part of 
A Theory of Justice is a heavy treatise on the importance of an institutional 
framework that will support individuals that will be able to choose in 
such a fashion. As a matter of fact, I believe that the second part of the 
book provides us with a historic account of how an ideal social-welfare 
function, from the standpoint of political liberalism, is possible. If we 
look at the methodological and deontological core represented by equal 
liberty, distributive justice and duties and obligations, we are looking at 
the history of the formation of the modern State, and it is within this 
modern State, that clearly takes shape in the constitutional revolutions in 
the United States, France and England, that Rawls sees the potential for 
a realization of his project.
This would answer the question “who are the individuals in the 
hypothetical original position”: the individuals that are in the end of the 
process of secularization and emancipation represented in the rise of the 
modern State. 
This means two things: first, it means that a modern, liberal, State is 
intuitively preferable to a non-modern, non-secular, State. Mostly because 
the conditions wherein a reasonable social welfare function is possible are 
only present in current and actually existent modern States. The other, 
is that this movement, because of its intuitive necessity, is defensible for 
States that are not yet modern, and that individuals in these States will 
move towards a more liberal and more secular position of rights – given 
the opportunity to do so. 
The second part of the argument is found in the universal claims 
about moral personality, or potential moral personality, in the third part 
of Rawls’ treatise: when we deal with the importance of the good, the 
sense of justice and the role of justice, we are dealing, at least according 
to Rawls, with features that are shared universally by human beings. 
Rawls main thesis is difficult to argue against: The ideals of freedom of 
speech and equal opportunity may very well be historical contingencies, 
peculiar to western cultures and with a dark and complex history. Still, 
our reasons to implement these Rights are sound, and we have no reason 
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to believe that others would not want to have these same rights, that they 
do not share our moral sentiments insofar they relate to fundamental 
principle of justices (freedom from bondage, equal opportunity among 
individuals, open possibilities for plans of live, etc.) The question is then 
one of increasing the reach of such rights: If the doctrine of modern 
philosophy created an unprecedented increase in the quality of life in 
the circumstances where those principles were effectively implemented, 
then why should we not attempt to implement such principles in a larger 
scope? In this sense, the liberal thesis becomes irresistible in Rawls. 
d) Towards a historic-phenomenological critique of choice
It is interesting to note that the approach suggested by both Arrow and 
Rawls has no shortage of mentions to “ideal types.” I do not think that 
the use of an “ideal” structure for the election, voting process and the 
conditions of democracy altogether, is a coincidence. As a matter of 
fact, Arrow and Rawls are both profoundly Weberian when they try to 
establish a mode in which an ideal structure is feasible. Note that Arrow 
will say that individual preferences are somehow present in social choices, 
and Rawls reminds us of Weber a great deal when he writes that values 
and ideals are reasonable insofar they can be justified by members of a 
society, at the same time that they are not really empirical. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, Rawls only mentions Weber 
once in A Theory of Justice The mention is hidden in the end of the book23, 
in a footnote, where Rawls accuses both Weber and Max Scheler (as far 
as I know, this is the only time Max Scheler is mentioned by Rawls) of 
providing a stratifying and stiff notion of vocation that does not allow 
for social change or mobility, and that does not explain changes in social 
motivation and preferences. 
And yet, without a non-static conception of time there is hardly any 
chance we will make sense of how preferences come to be the case. 
There is a whole set of expectations and representations that are taken 
for granted in the moment of decision. We constitute values in relation 
to our past, to our society, to our heritage. Does that mean that one 
created in a racist background will always be a racist? Not at all. But this 
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background will participate a great deal in the way that this individual 
will, for example, resist racism and constitute his own perspective on how 
and why racism is wrong. In that sense, the reality of values for individuals 
or group is socially constructed, and not built from scratch according to 
the desire of the philosopher. 
In this sense, even strategic motivations must be put in context, as 
well as the interaction that marks such strategy. Why is it that my attitude 
towards others leads me not to trust their ability to collaborate or to share 
a determined set of values with me? 
By focusing on the institutional determination of ideal types, we might 
take the social interaction for granted and ignore an important aspect 
of the “equation,” that is: the constitution of ideal types is necessarily 
connected to the historical construction of these ideal types. The process 
of signification of the structure of a cultural phenomena or an ideal 
conception is a result of a historical struggle which is connected to a 
number of interpretations of the phenomena and the ideal, this means 
that there is no institutional ideal type that is not in an interaction with 
subjects, and that there are no subjects that are outside of interaction as 
they conceive on an ideal type. Of course, in doing so we are already 
moving outside the grounds of a Weberian historicism and moving 
towards a phenomenological structuralism.
If we are able to recognize the importance of a reflective equilibrium 
between ideal principles of justice that are decided in a representative 
form, and a moral pedagogy that informs the decisions about conceptions 
of good. We must also understand that these processes are not static, nor are 
they always given in the same way or in the same environment. Reflecting 
this multiplicity of conceptions and the conflict of these conceptions 
is precisely what is at stake for the written form of a legislation that 
aims to enforce sociability among different individuals – and different 
socializations that come incarnate with these. 
1 Technical revision by Jessica Soester (PhD Candidate, Southern Illinois University, 
Carbondale)
2 WITTGENSTEIN. Lecture on Ethics. Available at http://sackett.net/WittgensteinEthics.
pdf (Last access 8/28/2012)
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3 RAWLS, John. A Theory of Justice. (1974, repr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
4 “[j]ustice as fairness holds that, with regard to the constitutional essentials and questions of 
basic justice, and given the existence of a reasonably well ordered constitutional regime, the 
family of basic political values expressed by its principles and ideas have sufficient weight to 
override all other values that may normally come into conflict with them”. RAWLS, Justice as 
Fairness: a restatement, p. 183. Also “From the standpoint of moral theory, the best account of 
a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any 
conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equili-
brium “. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, p. 43
5 Ibid, p. 185
6 Note that the entire development of the terms for the two principles of Justice in A Theory 
of Justice (p. 52-86) is based on the debates on distribution equilibrium in political economy. 
This debate is only made possible by Pareto’s reflections (A Theory of Justice, p. 58n) on fair 
distribution of goods. 
7 RAWLS. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, p. 260.
8 RAWLS. A Theory of Justice, p. 152
9 (x,z) are candidates, P = preference, I = indifference, R = preference or indifference in 
context. Connectedness: For all (the objects of choice in the set) x and y, either x R y or y R 
x. (A1); Transitivity: For all x, y, and z, xRy and yRz imply xRz. (A2). Thus, alternation (‘or’) 
and conjunction (‘and’) of R relations represent both the properties of an ordering for all the 
objects of choice. In this sense, the possibilities of ordering preferences will be so defined: D1: 
xPy <-> ~(yRx) (by A1) ; D2: xIy <-> {xRy and yRx) (by A2); D3: xRy <-> ~yPx
10 ARROW. A difficulty in Social Welfare. In: ARROW. The collected papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Vol. I: Social Choice and Justice, p. 26-7
11 See ARROW. Current Developments in the Theory of Social Choice. In: ARROW. The 
collected papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. I: Social Choice and Justice, p. 163
12 ARROW. Social Choice and Individual Values,p. 22-33
13 For Arrow: xPy is “social preference” of x over y (x is selected over y by the rule); xIy is 
“social indifference” between x and y (both are ranked the same by the rule) and xRy is either 
“social preference” of x over y or “social indifference” between x and y (x is ranked at least as 
good as y by the rule).
14 ARROW, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press.
15 A perfect information situation is one where individuals are aware of the possible set of 
preferences available for all other individuals in a plane. In game theory, this means that all 
possible moves of all players in the field are visible for all the players in the field (and players 
in the field have a similar understanding of the set of rules for the game). In economic theory 
this means that parts are aware of the risks and implications of their moves, and are able to 
move freely towards their preferable states or goods. Arrow is aware of the artificiality of this 
situation, but it is mathematically possible to conceive of such state, and this is enough for the 
viability of Pareto`s equilibrium – at least from an Economical standpoint. 
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16 The peculiarities of the so-called “paradox of voting” can be found in Arrow’s dissertation 
Social Choice and individual Values. 
17 As a matter of fact, Arrow was part of the team of economists that demonstrated the possi-
bility of Pareto’s Equilibrium.
18 Thus, for example, the necessity of the difference principle in Rawls. (see RAWLS. Justice 
as Fairness: A re-statement, p-158-9).
19 See the important of a social ordering of minimal preferences, or social consensus, in 
Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values, p 81-6. This is connected to the importance of a 
collective rationality that will serve as a “control” for self-interest and manipulation in the 
democratic process. Arrow is clearly uncomfortable when dealing with these issues, and most 
of his insights on the matter are vague and will only be fully explored in Rawls’ appropriation 
of Pareto’s equilibrium as a Reflective equilibrium.
20 Arrow prefers to call his theory an Ordinalist rather than Utilitarian theory. This is a result of 
what he considers a major re-appropriation of Mill’s notion of utility and choice. For Arrow, 
his preference criterion is a weaker, more modest, elaboration of Mill’s Decision criteria, one 
that relies on a minimal requisition for decision efficiency: transitivity and connectivity. In 
Arrow`s view, this is no longer utilitarian in the sense coined by Mill, it is rather Ordinalist, 
in the sense that it equals reason with choice-efficiency. If a choice is efficient (transitive 
and connected), then it is a rational choice (ARROW. Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian notes on 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice. In: ARROW. The collected papers of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. I: Social Choice 
and Justice, p. 98). Interestingly, Arrow thinks his notion of Ordinalism is overall compatible 
with Rawls’ position. This should not be surprising, given that Rawls also adopts the model of 
Pareto’s equilibrium for his Reflective equilibrium, and that both rely heavily on the notion 
of perfect information (though in a different way, as we will further see).
21 Compare, for example, the summarization of the Difference Principle in p.61- 3 of A Theory 
of Justice and its importance for a “system of cooperation” with what I have just analyzed in 
Arrow and Pareto. Also note that this entire discussion is operative on the terms introduced by 
Mill in his Political Economy and Utilitarism. 
22 See the paragraph 16 of A Theory of Justice, and p. 65 in Justice as Fairness. 
23 TJ: 479(n). Weber returns, however, in Justice as Fairness, p154n29, in an important footno-
te dealing with the inevitability of “loss” and human tragedy in the rise of new economic 
organizations. 
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